

Introduction

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At the turn of the twenty-first century, any suggestion that the authority of traditional centers of learning in Muslim-majority countries could be eclipsed by new Islamic institutions emerging in the West would have appeared so incongruous as to merit no debate: after all, Muslim diaspora communities in the West have from the beginning staffed their newly found mosques with *imāms* from their home countries.ⁱ Yet, as we will see in this volume, in 2016 such an assertion is easily defensible: increasingly, some of the prominent Islamic scholars today (with followers across the globe, especially among educated Muslims) are born or raised in the Western hemisphere. While Volume 1 mapped the discourses within the four most influential Islamic scholarly platforms in the Muslim-majority countries as they face pressures to adapt to the demands of modern times, this volume maps the weakening of their authority among pockets of second- and third-generation Muslims in the West whose socio-economic and cultural orientation is distinctly different from that of their parents' generation. Better educated than their parents and more socially integrated,ⁱⁱ many young Muslims are turning for advice to new Islamic scholarly platforms emerging in the West, led by charismatic scholars. To understand the landscape of contemporary Islamic authority, it is important to recognize the growing influence of these institutions emerging in the West. By mapping the on-going debates within these platforms, the volume illustrates how, despite growing concerns about the radicalization of young Muslims in the West, the current Islamic religious milieu in the West is highly conducive to nurturing an Islamic understanding which, while respecting the core of the Islamic tradition, is also proving adept at guiding young Muslims to be confident members of their respective societies.

Measured purely against the yardstick of traditional Islamic scholarly rigour, the scholars leading these platforms might not appear as grounded as the traditionally trained '*ulamā*' discussed in Volume 1. In fact, all scholars considered in this volume, apart from those from the Deoband tradition, avoid the title of '*ālim* (specialist in Islamic sciences); the most popular honorific used by their followers is that of *shaykh* (a more generic title of respect; a learned man). Most prefer to guide their followers, as we will see, to work of earlier scholars when it comes to addressing a complex *fiqh* issue, instead of trying to engage in a detailed discussion of Islamic legal theory themselves. Yet these scholars are highly effective in making educated young Muslims in the West, many of whom are leaving the mosques,ⁱⁱⁱ respect Islamic

legal and moral dictates. What explains their appeal? The answer to this rests in understanding how a legal or moral code, if it is to stay binding, has to demonstrate social relevance: these scholars are able to operationalize Islamic legal and ethical principles for the young Muslims; they are able to act as a bridge between Islamic and Western philosophical and legal traditions. In other words, the main strength of these new Islamic scholarly platforms emerging in the West rests in the ability of the scholars leading them to combine their *tacit* knowledge of the modern reality with the Islamic moral and legal framework.

Scholars writing about the importance of knowledge in social theory have emphasized the need to differentiate between various categories of knowledge. An important distinction is maintained between knowledge acquired through direct experience (*tacit or lay knowledge*) and knowledge that is acquired through a formal learning process (*communicable or specialist knowledge*). Introduced by Michael Polanyi, the concept of tacit knowledge has had popular appeal because of its implicit suggestion that “*we can know more than we can tell*”, as much human learning happens unconsciously through being part of a given environment, context, and culture.^{iv} The key to appreciating the importance of the new Islamic scholarly platforms emerging in the West rests in recognising the role of tacit knowledge in enabling a scholar to relate the Islamic legal and moral framework to the reality as understood by his followers.

The scholars leading these new initiatives have invested heavily in acquiring specialist knowledge of traditional Islamic sciences; most have dedicated many years to studying with traditional scholars in Muslim-majority countries. Their ability to demonstrate sound knowledge of these sciences is by all counts critical to establishing their authority. Their main appeal to educated young Muslims, however, rests not in their attempts to write complex treatises on Islamic *fiqh*; instead their influence stems from their ability to combine that specialized Islamic knowledge with their personal everyday experience of being a modern-educated Western Muslim who is exposed to the same opportunities, temptations, and challenges as they are. Coming mainly from middle-income and educated families, these scholars have a very different socio-economic and educational profile (and consequently different experiences, tastes, and sensibilities) from most of the traditionally trained ‘*ulamā*’ in the institutions profiled in Volume 1. These scholars are keen to combine Islamic and Western knowledge to enable young Muslims to see the links between their everyday life choices and the Islamic legal and moral framework. It is this ability to bridge the gap between Islamic and modern forms of knowledge, rather than necessarily a very fine command of traditional *fiqh*

debates, that is central to the growing appeal of the scholars profiled in this volume, because this is precisely the ability that many traditionally trained '*ulamā*' have lacked since the colonial period.^v

As is well recorded, the colonial period led to the displacement by Western educational institutions of *madrasahs* as the primary platform for imparting knowledge. The result was two-fold: one, *madrasah* education lost its socio-economic relevance, and a marked separation developed between Islamic and modern sciences; two, Muslim social elites deserted the *madrasahs* in favour of Western educational institutions.^{vi} Since the colonial period, *madrasahs* in all Muslim-majority countries have catered primarily to students from lower-income families; these very students then go on to become future teachers and '*ulamā*'.^{vii} The result is that the everyday realities and experiences of the Islamic scholars being trained through *madrasah* platforms are totally different from those of Muslims from upper-middle-income and affluent classes who, on the other hand, shape the socio-economic institutions. This has led to bifurcated mental models among Muslims, whereby Islam remains very important as a personal belief system, and in this arena '*ulamā*' continue to command respect, but in social, economic, and political matters, Islamic law or moral code, and '*ulamā*' who claim specialist expertise in it, are seen as irrelevant.^{viii}

The real contribution of these new Islamic scholars in the West is that they are reversing this isolation of Islamic and modern knowledge (some consciously, others unknowingly), for two reasons. First, these scholars are keen to draw parallels between Islamic moral, legal, and philosophical concepts and those concepts that have become globally influential under Western influence. These scholars take the dominant Western realities and then explain them within an Islamic framework, not necessarily by participating in complex *fiqh* debates (although they do use some core concepts or refer to work of a specialist), but by resolving the apparent intellectual tension between Islam and modern social reality. Being able to engage equally effectively with both the modern and Islamic modes of knowledge and thinking, these scholars are particularly effective in operationalizing the Islamic moral and legal framework for young and socially integrated Muslims in the West who want to balance the demands of their faith with being active members of their societies. Second, because they themselves come from middle-income social strata, they have tacit knowledge of the reality as experienced by their followers, and thus can relate to their concerns more meaningfully.

Here it is also very important to note that the key to the growing popularity of the institutions profiled in this volume is that, even though they are actively trying to connect Islamic and Western philosophical concepts and debates, they are not aspiring to create a ‘modern’ or ‘enlightened’ Islam, unlike the post-colonial secular political and military élites, who wanted Islamic dictates to fit the Western moral and legal framework.^{ix} Instead, the potential of these initiatives to become the leading voice of Islam in the coming decades rests in their keenness to stay true to Islamic legal dictates while also deploying the methodological creativity allowed in classical Islamic *fiqh* (jurisprudence) to keep abreast of contemporary realities. Thus, while encouraging reasoned debate and trying to build synergy between many Western and Islamic concepts and ethics, unlike the modernists, these scholars do not agree with abandoning or reforming aspects of Islamic *fiqh* which are seen to be inconsistent with Western modernity or liberal theory; instead their focus is on learning to respect the core of Islamic *fiqh* while being confident enough to reason and debate and find creative responses to questions whose answers are either unsettled or require fresh reasoning in the light of the changed context. This balance between being loyal to tradition and staying responsive to modern changes is not easily struck (as we also saw in Volume 1); yet we will see how the deliberations taking place on the platforms covered in this volume are highly promising.

It is precisely because of their commitment to strive for such a balance that I contend that these institutions are to play an important role in the way Islam is understood and lived by *affluent* Muslim communities around the globe. The emphasis on 'affluent' is noteworthy; as we will see, it is material affluence, rather than nationality or ethnicity, that best explains the growing appeal of these institutions, both within the diaspora Muslim communities in the West and among more educated youth in Muslim-majority countries. It is the young, educated, and civilization-sensitive Muslims (who regard Islam not just as a rigid theological or legal framework but as a rich philosophical, cultural, and legalistic tradition) that are most visible among the followers of the institutions in question. Admittedly, such an assertion about the profile of their followers needs to be supported by survey data. For now, I base this claim on the prolonged fieldwork that I have been conducting with some of the institutions considered in this volume, through participation in their retreats, conferences, and seminars, and interviews with their members (see Preface). The followers whom I have interviewed almost always come from more economically prosperous, educated, and socially progressive sections of society, whether from within the Muslim diaspora communities in the West or from Muslim-majority countries. Their influence on Muslim social elites around the globe is, therefore, growing; and

driving this expansion are the globalized sensibilities of economically well-to-do Muslims, who are increasingly part of the global value system and culture mapped in some detail in Volume 1.

Thus, while many studies show that the planners of militant attacks come from educated and upper-middle-income classes,^x this volume reinforces the conclusion from Volume 1 that profiles of individual militants should not distract us from the fact that economic prosperity and democratic strengthening in Muslim societies are the best antidotes to militant Islam. As studies have shown, among the ideologically driven, it is not individual grievances but societal injustices or perceived marginalization of the communities to which those individuals belong that more often than not help to create sympathy for radical movements.^{xi} Many, however, are driven not by ideology or economics but (as we are increasingly finding in cases of recent attacks in Western cities) by perverse incentives: a sense of adventure, frustrated aspirations, or simple criminal and deviant behaviour.^{xii} In order to appreciate the significance of these new scholarly platforms in the West for shaping the Islam of the future, it is important to start by profiling the Muslim diaspora communities in the West and tracing the evolution of Islamic knowledge-transmission platforms within them.

Muslims and Islamic knowledge transmission in the West

While it is true that Islam spread rapidly to new territories within the first century of its emergence, it arguably became a truly global religion in the second half of the twentieth century, with Muslim communities of notable sizes emerging in Western Europe, North America, and to some degree even in Australia and New Zealand.^{xiii} In 2010, there were an estimated 44 million Muslims in Europe, constituting 5.9 per cent of the total population;^{xiv} in the USA, the total number of Muslims is estimated to be 3.3 million; at 0.8 per cent of the total population they constitute a much smaller share of the citizenry, yet their presence is equally pronounced. The profile of Muslim immigrant populations, however, varies both within Europe and between Europe and North America. Within Europe, the Muslim immigrant populations, barring a few exceptions, have strong links to the host country's colonial past. In the UK, the South Asian migrants, particularly from Pakistan and Bangladesh, constitute the most visible Muslim community, followed by Arabs and Africans.^{xv} In France, Algerians and Moroccans have strong roots, as do Turks. In Germany, the Muslim immigrants are predominantly of

Turkish origin, while Spain and Italy have comparatively smaller pockets of Muslim populations (see Table 0.1).

Table 0. 1: Profile of Muslim Population in the West

Country	Muslim Population (No).	Muslim population (% share of population)	Key countries of origin
Europe & UK			
Germany	4,760,000	5.8	Turkey
France	4,710,000	7.5	Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
United Kingdom	2,960,000	4.8	Pakistan, India, Bangladesh
Italy	2,220,000	3.7	Libya, Eritrea, Somalia
Bulgaria	1,020,000	13.7	Turkey
Netherlands	1,000,000	6.0	Turkey, Morocco
Spain	9800,000	2.1	Mixed (Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.)
Belgium	630,000	5.9	Tukey, Morocco
Greece	610,000	5.3	Turkey
Austria	450,000	5.4	Turkey, Bosnia
Sweden	430,000	4.6	Middle East, Iraq, Iran
Cyprus	280,000	25.3	Turkey
Denmark	230,000	4.1	Mixed
Romania	70,000	0.3	Mixed
Slovenia	70,000	3.6	Bosnia
Croatia	60,000	1.4	Mixed
Ireland	50,000	1.1	South Asia, Turkey
Finland	40,000	0.8	Mixed
Portugal	30,000	0.3	Mixed
Luxembourg	10,000	2.3	Mixed
North America			

United States (2015)	3, 300,000	1	Whites (28%), African-American (35%), Asians (18%), Hispanic (18%)
Canada (2011)	940,000	2.8	Mixed (Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia, Morocco, etc.)

Source: Pew Research Centre.

These migratory trends, which developed from the middle of the twentieth century, were mainly a product of growing demands for labour in the fast-industrializing economy of Europe: not surprisingly, port cities and industrial towns developed the most densely populated Muslim neighborhoods.^{xvi} The first generation of European Muslims who filled this demand for labour came overwhelmingly from low-income rural communities in their home countries, and they were the least endowed with the attributes—such as language, cultural exposure, or education—known to facilitate economic prosperity and cultural integration among migrant communities. Overwhelmingly Muslim neighborhoods such as the Savile neighborhood in Dewsbury in the United Kingdom or Molenbeek in Brussels,^{xvii} which are today almost closed enclaves nurturing a parallel culture within their host communities, are products of these migratory origins. For these communities, ill-equipped to integrate with the host communities or secure white-collar jobs, the economic marginalization of the first generation of immigrants has persisted until the present day.^{xviii} In the United Kingdom, for example, only 25 per cent of the Muslim population is engaged in economic activity: the lowest level within all religious groups; fewer Muslims are in the top three professional occupations than members of any other faith community.^{xix} Successive waves of migration in the 1980s and subsequently in the present century have, however, attracted a more mixed pool of immigrants: globalization has increased opportunities for formal-sector employment, at least for individuals with technical skills.^{xx}

In the United States, on the other hand, the Muslim migration pattern has historically been different, and so is the socio-economic profile of the Muslim communities. Unlike Europe, the United States restricted immigration opportunities for all but the relatively better-educated and professional individuals. This has led to distinctly different patterns of integration, whereby Muslims have been happy to be part of the American melting pot.^{xxi} Muslims in the United States, on the whole, live in more ethnically and religiously mixed

neighborhoods and are economically better off than their counterparts in the UK and Europe.^{xxii} The United States also nurtures a distinct Black Muslim culture, owing much to the legacy of Malcolm X.^{xxiii} The two communities have traditionally had weak links, owing to their different socio-economic profiles. The Black American Muslims often come from lower-income backgrounds and neighborhoods than the immigrant communities;^{xxiv} prisons, in particular, proved a fertile ground for conversions among Blacks.^{xxv} This economic divide is visible in many states and cities—Chicago being a good example—with the result that mosque culture varies strongly, depending on neighborhood characteristics. Recent initiatives, such as Zaytuna College (covered in this volume), which is led by two extremely prominent American Muslim converts—one black and the other white—are, however, demonstrating the potential to bridge this divide.

Across Europe, including the United Kingdom, and the United States, in order to preserve their Islamic beliefs and practices the first generation of Muslim immigrants found it essential to sponsor an *imām* (Islamic scholar) from their home communities to staff the local mosque.^{xxvi} The *imām*'s services were needed both to conduct the essential prayer rituals and to provide Islamic education for the young. Given the propensity within the first generation of immigrants to settle in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods, the mosques in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe have emerged mostly on ethnic and linguistic lines, each catering to the needs of the community that established and financed it.^{xxvii} In the United States the experience was similar, although, because neighborhoods are more mixed, the worshippers and the *imāms* in the mosques have a more ethnically mixed profile.^{xxviii} This heavy reliance on *imāms* from Muslim-majority countries has meant that dominant Islamic scholarly traditions have expanded successfully into the Western context. The four traditional centers of Islamic learning covered in Volume 1—al-Azhar, Diyanet, Deoband, and Saudi Salafism—were thus, not surprisingly, able to expand their influence to the Muslim diaspora in the West. *Imāms* trained in these four institutions lead many of the mosques across the United States, the United Kingdom, and other parts of Europe.^{xxix} Some, as we will see, have also established important satellite institutions in the West.

While the Muslim communities in all European countries are influenced by all four of the traditions cited above, the extent of the influence of a particular institution in each country is proportional to the ethnic make-up of its Muslim diaspora community. Within Western Europe, Germany, the Netherlands, and France, which have large numbers of Turkish

immigrants, Diyanet provides *imāms* to staff most Turkish mosques.^{xxx} However, some Turkish communities, such as *Suleymancis*, *Millî Görüş*, and *Fethullah Gülen*, historically suspicious of Diyanet's secular outlook, have preferred to have their own *imāms*; the *Gülen* movement, since being implicated in the failed 2016 Turkish military coup, is, however, increasingly under pressure. Similarly, the presence of large numbers of *maghrebi* immigrants, mainly from Morocco, has meant that *imāms* trained in Moroccan religious institutions staff many European mosques sponsored by Moroccan communities; as John Bowen notes in his analysis of the French Islamic discourse, a mosque like the one in Fez will do for most French Muslims.^{xxxii} Morocco's Hassan II Foundation has also played a role in facilitating such links. However, within this community, the influence of al-Azhar University graduates has also been significant.

Within the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the large numbers of South Asian immigrants have ensured the domination of Deobandi Islam and its related missionary movement, Tablighi Jamaat. Unlike Diyanet and al-Azhar, the Deoband movement extended its influence within diaspora communities not solely through the supply of *imāms* or its graduates, but also by establishing a number of *madrasahs* in the United Kingdom and the United States. The Darul Uloom Deoband in Bury (established in 1975) and the one in Dewsbury (established in 1982, and also acting as the headquarters of *Tablīghī Jamā'at* in Europe) serve as important platforms for the teaching and training of *imāms* in the Deoband tradition in the West, as do their counterparts in New York and Buffalo. Although various other denominations in Sunni as well as Shia Islam have a visible presence in Europe^{xxxii} and the United States, these four traditions remain the most influential. Within South Asian communities, the main competition posed to Deoband comes from Bareilvis, *Jamaat-i-Islami*, and more recently *Minhaj ul Quran*; the latter has a particularly expansive network in the Netherlands.^{xxxiii}

More recently, however, three developments have facilitated the emergence of new Islamic scholarly platforms in the West. The first is the changing profile of the second- and third-generation Muslims, especially in the United Kingdom and other countries in Europe. While in the United States the first generation itself prospered economically and thereby was more integrated into the mainstream of society,^{xxxiv} in the United Kingdom and Europe in general similar improvements are visible in pockets of second- and third-generation Muslims.^{xxxv} Access to higher education, employment in the formal sector, and growing up in

a Western cultural framework are changing the subjectivities of many young Muslims, compared with their parents' generation.^{xxxvi} It is thus not surprising that media reports indicate a decline in youth participation in mosque activities staffed by overseas *imāms*.^{xxxvii}

Second, while September 11th has exposed Muslims to negative media publicity which has inflamed Islamophobia, these developments have also had an unexpected positive outcome: that of initiating critical self-reflection among many young Muslims. A few might have become radicalized since September 11th, but others have been motivated to study Islamic texts to assess for themselves the validity of different claims attributed to Islam. This process of reflection and retrospection has led them to explore a range of Islamic education platforms and to search for scholars who can make sense of both Islam and the reality of their life in the Western world. The relative economic prosperity of the second- and third-generation Muslims compared with their parents' generation, and the increased self-reflection triggered by the events of September 11th, has thus led to a generation of young Western Muslims who are reluctant to learn their Islam from an *imām* who does not share their background (often not even their language), and with whom they struggle to associate. The language in itself becomes a major barrier to establishing meaningful dialogue, and the *imām*'s lack of modern education and totally different cultural exposure further fails to engender respect.^{xxxviii}

Third, especially in the United States, a visible community of Western converts has emerged. Many of these have embraced Islam not because of radical or reactionary tendencies, which at times are attributed to Western converts,^{xxxix} but in response to their inner calling. Many have a strong Christian background and are from educated middle-income families. Their embrace of Islam is thus not reactionary but a result of deep reflection on matters of theology. This volume shows how highly influential Muslim scholars in the West are emerging from within this expanding pool of converts. Many among them spend considerable time in the Muslim world, learning the basic texts; on their return, the knowledge acquired at the traditional centers of learning provides the legitimacy that leads to leadership positions within Muslim communities. The mixed origins of these converts enable them to choose a moderate path which, while being true to the core elements of the Islamic *fiqh*, is not hostile to Western tradition. Two of the most influential scholars among young Western Muslims—Humza Yusuf and Tim Winter (Abdal Hakim Murad)—share precisely this profile.

These recent developments, we will see, have spurred new Islamic initiatives in the West, with visible followings among educated young Muslims around the globe. Equally

important is to note how the scholarly platforms emerging in North America are actually extremely dynamic. This reflects the difference in the economic profile of American Muslims. In the United States, most new Islamic educational and propagation platforms actually charge quite heavily for their services:^{xi} an affluent Muslim community, such as the one in America, which can pay for the use of these services, and can also donate generously,^{xli} is an essential prerequisite for these initiatives to thrive. Before looking at these initiatives, it is important to understand how Western states have tried to regulate Islamic education platforms and practices, and how these efforts have had little or no success.

Indigenizing Islam in the West: from above

If September 11th has led to self-reflection among Muslim youth in the West, this period is also noticeable for the increased efforts by European governments to regulate or complement more effectively the mosque-based Islamic education platforms that have over the years multiplied among migrant Muslim populations. From the 1990s onwards, most European states began to recognize the need to better regulate the Islamic education sphere that was evolving within their Muslim communities. This led to increased efforts to establish state-led consultations, to form Muslim councils which would enable states to negotiate with different Islamic groups on one platform, and to establish commissions to represent the Muslim faith.^{xlii} Prior to that, European states largely had a hands-off approach towards regulating Islamic education; Jonathan Laurence notes how until quite recently this was a task left to the foreign embassies of Muslim countries, which led to the domination of what he calls “Embassy Islam”.^{xliii} Since September 11th, these efforts have acquired more immediate importance.

Studying the relationship between state and mosques in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Laurence notes that “State–mosque relations are of vital importance because these institutional links with religious communities prepare the ground for long-term political integration.”^{xliiv} Mosques are important not just for children’s education (a service which, as some studies have shown, is not as widely used as is often perceived, with many children dropping out before completing the course^{xlv}), but for the wider networking opportunities that they provide for proselytizing groups such as Tablighi Jamaat, Salafis, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.^{xlvi} Since September 11th, European governments have initiated programs to cultivate better links with the mosques; they have also argued for an

increased role for Islamic councils, established in some form by all European countries. The governments have encouraged these councils, such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB),^{xlvii} to bring members of opposing Muslim groups together on one platform, because this helps them to regulate Islamic discourse. As Laurence notes: “State policies toward Islam between 1990 and 2010 have consisted of governments soliciting assurances directly from a broad range of Muslim groups in order to bring them into a regime of religious recognition for Islam, and doing so without significantly altering European state–church institutions.”^{xlviii} These councils, he concludes, have helped to break the monopoly of “Embassy Islam”.

But government efforts have not been confined to the mosques and the councils. In recent years many governments have initiated new programs aimed at eradicating radical strands of Islam, driven by the realization that “either we train our Muslims to become global citizens, who live in a democratic, pluralist society, or on the contrary, the Islamists win, and take over those Muslim European constituencies.”^{xlix} Consequently, many European states have been involved in a protracted dialogue with the leaders of Muslim communities concerning the need to reform the existing models of Islamic education provision, which are viewed as promoting values that contradict the Western liberal tradition.¹ Some have initiated parallel programs. The Netherlands, for instance, made it obligatory for *imāms* arriving from foreign lands to attend a compulsory cultural-orientation program;^{li} Germany has moved towards establishing University Chairs in Islamic Theology.^{lii} These efforts aim to initiate a more indigenized debate on Islam within European mosques and other Islamic platforms in Europe, and are seen as critical to circumventing the reliance on *imāms* imported from Muslim-majority countries. The move toward promoting locally trained *imāms*, or making it compulsory for *imāms* coming from overseas to attend introductory programs on the culture of the host country, is hoped to make mosques conducive to integrating Muslims within Europe and reducing channels for the radicalization of Muslim youth. These attempts reflect a recognition by European states that those who control the centers of Islamic teaching and get to interpret Islamic texts for the public exercise significant influence on the actions of believers.

In many ways these efforts by British and other European governments to reform Islamic educational institutions and make their teaching compliant with the demands of Western modernity share much with the initiatives in post-colonial Muslim states where Westernized elites were keen to reform Islam and the Islamic educational platforms to promote a more modern vision of society. The outcomes of these efforts led by European governments

are also the same: they are largely failing. The governments' failure to design effective programs that can win support from moderate and conservative Muslims alike results both from their lack of credibility (as non-Muslim states, the reforms that are initiated are perceived to be motivated by vested interests) and from a genuine inability to decipher what an Islamic intellectual reform project should look like for it is not to appear as just another attempt at secularizing Islam.

Compared with these state-led efforts, new Islamic scholarly platforms emerging in the West are much more successful in establishing a debate in favor of indigenizing Islam in the West. Bruinessen and Allievi note how Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan have both proposed the concept of 'Euro-Islam', though with differing emphases.^{liii} They note that both these scholars have also implied that "the way Europe Muslims are reshaping the relationship between Islam and society will bear upon the future of Islam in the Muslim-majority world as well."^{liv} Tibi's and Ramadan's predictions are indeed proving to be correct. The emergence of more educated second- and third-generation Muslims in Europe and the United States, combined with the attention that Islam has received on the global stage since September 11th, while nudging some Muslim youth toward radical Islam, have made others think more actively about their religion and propelled them to seek the intellectual or deeply spiritual dimensions of Islam. While much attention has been paid to the influence on young Muslims of Ibn Taymīyah (associated with militant Islam in popular media),^{lv} evidence of growing interest in the works of al-Ghazālī, Ibn 'Arabī, and Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī^{lvi} among young Muslims has been ignored.

This volume covers institutions that are responding to the changed profiles and tastes of the second- and third-generation Muslim youth in the West and are also becoming increasingly popular among the educated and affluent sections of society in Muslim-majority countries. Some of these trends are entirely home-grown in the West, others are extensions of institutions covered in Volume 1, but for them to be included in this volume they had to be proving more reflective and adaptive to the changing context than the parent institution.

Indigenizing Islam in the West: from below

Before introducing the institutions covered in this volume, a word on their selection is in order. The genesis of this volume rests in the interviews that I conducted in the summer of 2012 with the aim of understanding the sources of Islamic knowledge for young educated British and European Muslims. Who are they going to for religious advice, whether in person or via the internet? The triggers for these interviews were a couple of media reports in the British press which argued that many young educated Muslims, finding it difficult to relate to the *imāms* from overseas, are leaving the mosques. Anecdotal in nature, the arguments advanced in these media accounts were nonetheless convincing, as they pointed toward shifts in the subjectivities of young Western Muslims akin to what I was witnessing in Muslim-majority countries (see Volume 1). These interviews very quickly revealed that in Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and the United States young educated Muslims were impressed by a similar profile of scholars, and the most popular Islamic scholars and platforms were actually based in the United States: Humza Yusuf emerged as the most popular figure in each country. The scholars identified also mostly had some institutional base of their own through which they were trying to embed their scholarship. This second element was a particularly important factor in their selection for inclusion in this volume, because if centers of Islamic learning in the Muslim-majority countries are to be rivalled, they have to be rivalled by institutions that can grow and survive beyond the lifetime of a single scholar.

These interviews made clear that institutions that are trying to develop new methodologies to merge the distinct philosophical as well as pedagogical approaches associated with Western versus Islamic scholarly tradition were the ones that had most traction among the economically mobile and integrated young Muslim population. The popularity of scholars leading these institutions was visible in the packed halls that greeted their public appearances; in their extensive web presence, whereby not only are their speeches made available on YouTube, but most get thousands of hits;^{lvii} and in their full diaries, which as a result of ever-growing requests for lectures and public appearances are increasingly maintained by professional secretaries. The methodological approaches advocated by these different scholars vary, but a central contribution of this volume is to highlight how the new initiatives that they are inspiring can be meaningfully grouped in three categories: *neo-traditionalism*, *neo-legalism*, and *neo-conservatism*. Further, while all the scholars profiled in this volume are arguing for finding the moderate path that can enable Muslims to stay loyal to Islamic moral and legal codes while staying productively engaged with modern-day realities, each one is conscious that its proposed approach should first and foremost be tailored to the needs of his

immediate community. Thus the need to create an ‘American Islam’, a ‘British Islam’, or a ‘European Islam’ that is responsive to the unique conditions faced by Muslims in these societies is a recurrent theme in the discourse of these scholars.

This volume covers the most prominent institutions representative of each of the three trends identified above. The fact that the selected institutions are mainly based in the United States and the United Kingdom was not the result of a conscious decision; it is reflective of the absence of comparably influential new Muslim institutions in other European contexts. This is not to say that interesting educational initiatives are not emerging in Europe.

INSERT MAP 1: Key Sites of Islamic Knowledge Production: The USA and The UK

New and interesting institutions in other European contexts do indeed exist; one important example is that of *Alqueria de Rosales*. Located in the mountains north of Granada in southern Spain, *Alqueria de Rosales* is one of the first *madrasahs* in contemporary Spain, having been established almost 20 years ago.^{lviii} This educational and cultural initiative is led by a small group of Spanish converts who are working toward reviving the rich intellectual tradition associated with the Islamic heritage of Andalusia. While the Foundation aims to move toward establishing more formal education programs, it currently provides one- to two-week retreats, of which the most popular focuses on the work of al-Ghazālī. These retreats bring together Muslims from all walks of life, from the West as well as Muslim-majority countries. The 2012 and 2014 retreats in which I participated attracted not only a large number of young, second-generation Muslims from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Spain, but also a number of young students and professionals from Egypt, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries. It is thus at one level a very influential institutional platform for Islamic learning emerging in Europe. However, it is yet to fully develop a strong educational program of its own; its retreats draw heavily on visiting scholars from the United Kingdom and the United States, in particular Tim Winter and Dr Umar Faruq Abd-ullah respectively.

Thus, new Islamic scholarly platforms are evolving in the other European contexts,^{lix} but most are yet to gain visibility beyond their surrounding communities. The scholars based in the United Kingdom and the United States have the advantage of working in English, which makes their lectures and writings globally accessible. It is therefore no surprise that it was the

young British and European Muslims whom I interviewed across the United Kingdom and mainland Europe who made me first recognize the strong following of Humza Yusuf. Further, as is the case with *Rosales*, many European institutions are evolving but need more time to consolidate their work before they gain visible influence. Finally, most of the new initiatives within Germany, France, and the Netherlands are still mosque-based, whereby *imāms* trained from within the second or third generation of immigrant Muslims are adopting new approaches^{lx}; their impact is, however, quite localized. The institutions analyzed in this volume are constantly trying to strike the right balance between staying loyal to the Islamic tradition yet being responsive to the needs of modern times. This, as we have seen in Volume 1, is the central challenge for all Islamic authorities.

Neo-traditionalism

Neo-traditionalism is an approach which interprets the Islamic scholarly tradition as being inherently adept at coping with change and diversity; its focus is on reviving a respect for rich Islamic scholarly tradition as preserved by the four Sunni *madhhabs*, while simultaneously cultivating an appreciation for *taṣawuf* (Islamic mysticism) through working on ‘cleansing of the heart’. Learning the *adab* (Islamic norms of behavior) and being in the *Ṣuḥba* (companionship) of the scholars is central to this approach. The focus remains on inculcating a deep faith in God through the teaching of the ‘*aqīdah* (creed), cultivating a commitment to fulfilling Islamic ritual practices, and, most importantly, guiding students to experience both the philosophical and mystical aspects of *taṣawuf*. Thus Rūmī and Ibn ‘Arabī, the former representing the more mystical aspects of Sufism and the latter linked to the most philosophical strands, are both important to this tradition, as is al-Ghazālī. This approach is noticeable for its emphasis on diversity and spirituality; it is also explicitly opposed to Wahhabism, which it sees as posing a threat to a true understanding of Islam. The neo-traditionalist approach thus aims to combine rationality, spirituality, and Islamic legal tradition.

This approach, which is very close in spirit to Turkish and al-Azhari readings of the Islamic tradition (see Volume 1), and is proving highly popular among young university going Muslims in the West, is associated in particular with a growing pool of Western converts who are taking prominent teaching roles within the Muslim communities in the West. The most prominent of these are Humza Yusuf in the United States and Tim Winter in the United

Kingdom. Equally respectful of the Islamic and Christian traditions, they show how Islam actually can help to address many challenges posed by Western modernity, such as excessive materialism and individual isolation; their critiques of modernity are very much in line with those associated with Western philosophers such as Charles Taylor.^{lxi} Both have also moved towards establishing institutions that can help to spread their conception of the authentic Islamic tradition: Zaytuna College in Berkeley (USA) and Cambridge Muslim College in Cambridge (UK).

Zaytuna College is the first Islamic liberal arts college in the United States; it was established in Berkeley in 2009 by Humza Yusuf and Imam Zaid Shakir. The goal is to provide an Islamic education model “rooted in the Western liberal arts tradition” which can enable the student to “pursue a life of thought and reflection.”^{lxii} The stated agenda of this College is to “indigenize Islam in the West.”^{lxiii} Proud equally of their Western heritage and their Islamic identity, these scholars argue that Islam is no stranger to the Western tradition. In their view, historically both traditions learned from each other; they argue that there is a need for Muslims to revive the authentic Islamic tradition that is capable of engaging productively with modernity, rather than reacting to it. Further, they argue that Muslims in the West have the resources, the educational opportunities, and the social context most suited to support such a reform.

The College offers a bachelor degree in Islamic Studies, based on its own integrated curriculum which provides a serious grounding in foundational Islamic texts as well as in those from the Western philosophical tradition. Its degrees are open to both men and women and are designed to train students to become “Muslim community and religious leaders, succeeding in graduate and professional schools, entering into public service, and becoming inspiring Islamic Studies teachers in rapidly expanding networks of Muslim schools in Northern American and elsewhere in the Western world.”^{lxiv} The founders of the College are proving very effective in mobilizing resources. Many of its students receive financial support, and the College recently acquired a new building in a very central area of Berkeley, next to the University of California Berkeley campus. Through Humza Yusuf the College is also linked to many other influential Islamic learning initiatives that are proving equally popular among young, educated, and socially progressive Muslims, and through them increasingly also their parents: *Rihla*, Sacred Caravan, and Sandala Productions.^{lxv}

The comparable institution in the United Kingdom is Cambridge Muslim College (CMC). Established in 2002 by three trustees of the Muslim Academic Trust—Yusuf Islam (the famous British convert singer-songwriter Cat Stevens), Shaykh Tijani Gahbiche, and Tim Winter—this College is mainly the brainchild of Tim Winter. At CMC one of the main initiatives is dedicated to teaching graduates from British Islamic seminaries, namely the *dār al-‘ulūms*, in order to augment their religious learning with a liberal arts training. The goal is to have these students better understand the realities of contemporary British society so that they can better serve their communities. The College has launched a four-year Islamic Studies program, starting in 2016.^{lxvi} The CMC is thus making slow but steady progress towards its goal of becoming “a recognised centre of excellence offering a BA and MA in Islamic Studies, taught by a team of Islamic scholars in conjunction and collaboration with the expertise available at the University of Cambridge”.^{lxvii}

Neo-legalism

This second approach is equally focused on enabling Islam to enrich Western modernity, guided by the conviction that Islam can in fact provide a moral framework capable of overcoming many challenges faced by the West; but its proposed methodology is totally different from that of the neo-traditionalists. Here the emphasis on *ṣuḥba* as well as *taṣawwuf* is entirely absent. Instead, the focus is purely on finding answers to contemporary challenges by attempting to bridge the gap between Islamic law, contemporary realities, and modern sciences. The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), an institute in a suburb of Washington DC, has played the most important part in leading this project.^{lxviii} Having many prominent Muslim scholars on its board of directors, the institute represents one of the earliest efforts in the West to develop methodological tools to adjust Islamic laws to contemporary needs. The institute’s mission statement emphasizes its dedication to “revival and reform of Islamic thought and its methodology in order to enable the *Ummah* to deal effectively with present challenges, and contribute to the progress of human civilization in ways that will give it a meaning and a direction derived from divine guidance. The realization of such a position will help the *Ummah* regain its intellectual and cultural identity and re-affirm its presence as a dynamic civilization.”^{lxix} The case of IIIT is particularly useful in illustrating how efforts to bridge the gulf between Islam and modern knowledge have faced serious challenges and have more often than not converged on using *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah* (principles of the *sharī‘ah*) as the

most useful reconciliatory tool. By emphasizing the need to focus on the underlying purposes of *sharī'ah*, instead of following specific legal dictates, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* allows for reinterpretation of the orthodox Islamic texts and laws in the light of contemporary needs, and it has major implications for what could be considered just in Islamic law.

The other related initiative fitting this category is the Centre for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE), funded by the Qatar Foundation.^{lxx} Launched in 2012, the Centre is led by Professor Tariq Ramadan, who alongside Humza Yusuf is one of the most influential contemporary Islamic thinkers, widely popular among young Muslims in the West, and who, although initially writing extensively about the need for European Muslims to carve out a distinctive European Islam, is today increasingly confident that the Islamic discourse emerging in the West has resonance with Muslims around the globe, due to young Muslims' shared experiences. The Centre aims to initiate an intellectual discourse within Islam which will make it possible to find real-life answers to the needs of Muslims in Europe, as well as those in Muslim-majority countries, while staying true to the spirit of *sharī'ah*. Himself a professor at Oxford University, at the Centre Ramadan is leading a major program which brings the scholars of the *fiqh* together with scholars of the context, to enable the two sides to discuss the modern challenges in line with Islamic ethics. Some of the themes under research include gender, economy, medicine and bioethics, and the environment.^{lxxi}

Neo-conservatism

While the institutions representing the above two approaches have evolved primarily on their own, the third category relates to institutions that are an extension of the two most conservative Islamic scholarly platforms covered in Volume 1, namely Deoband and Saudi Salafism, but the scholars leading them are keen to make their tradition relate to modern challenges. The two Deobandi institutions covered in this section—Ebrahim College in the United Kingdom and Darul Qasim in the United States—show how some graduates of *dār al-'ulūms* are moving on to advocate adjustments from within the Deobandi tradition. Darul Qasim, which operates out of Chicago, is worthy of attention because it is a unique effort from within the Deobandi tradition to encourage a more pluralistic study of Islam. Unlike the traditional Deobandi focus on *taqlīd* of *Ḥanafī madhhab* (see Volume 1, Section 3), Darul Qasim is developing a curriculum which allows the student to study any of the four Sunni *madhhabs* in its attempt to

allow for plurality of thought within Islamic learning.^{lxxii} At the same time the *madrasah* retains the traditional Deobandi commitment to mastering the core Islamic texts in detail. Similarly, Ebrahim College in the United Kingdom is an attempt by graduates of traditional Deobandi *dār al-‘ulūms* in the United Kingdom to encourage a more socially embedded reading of Islamic texts, which will enable young Muslims to better relate to their British identity.

Within the Saudi Salafi tradition, the work of Yasir Qadhi at AlMaghrib Institute, operating out of New York, is noticeable for similar versatility. The goal of AlMaghrib, founded in 2002, “is to make learning Islam in a quality fashion as easy as possible.”^{lxxiii} The Institute is keen to explore “how could we teach you Islam in a way that was fun, social, quality, spiritual, and oh yeah, academic?”^{lxxiv} AlMaghrib focuses on conducting seminars all over the world, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and even a few Gulf States such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. These seminars and classes aim to tackle some of the most difficult and controversial topics head-on, whether the rise of militant atheism, or the evolution issue, the existence of evil, political allegiances, rebellion against dictators, secular feminism, the conflict between citizenship and the support for armed forces that are pressing forward with their own agenda regardless, and so much more.^{lxxv}

The institute also offers a bachelor's degree, and although the degree is not yet accredited, teaching takes place in four departments: Islamic Theology and Ethics, Islamic Law and Legal Theory, *Qur’ānic* and Ḥadīth Sciences, and Islamic History and Homiletics. Yasir Qadhi’s defence of same-sex marriage laws in America, his approach to liberal citizenship, and his views about Islamic law are alien to many mainstream Salafis. In order to argue for new interpretations, he uses various conservative historical *fatwās*, such as the ban on the printing press, to highlight the negative effect that conservative *fatwās* can have on Muslim life. The case of Yasir Qadhi in particular shows how by ignoring the *madhhabs* Salafism can on the one hand lead to highly conservative social rulings (see Volume 1, Section 2), while the same Salafi methodology can be used to convince Muslims in the West to respect the secular constitution of the country of which they are nationals.

Thus, one of the striking features of these initiatives is that they have all come to appreciate the importance of developing an Islamic discourse that is primarily formulated in response to the immediate social context. Hence, all these institutions are talking about developing a Western Islam, or a European Islam, or a British Islam, or an American Islam. This emphasis in itself reflects the importance that these platforms are placing on making

Islamic discourse relate to the everyday reality of young people. None is arguing for abandoning what is broadly viewed as the core of Islamic *fiqh*, but all are in agreement that Islamic legal and scholarly tradition requires them to engage in reasoned debate to find answers that are consistent with the spirit of the Sharī‘ah and also are optimal responses to the needs of the time. The findings here are thus very much in line with John Bowen’s analysis of the Islamic platforms in the United Kingdom and France: concerning Sharī‘ah Councils in the United Kingdom, he similarly argues that they are trying to strike a balance between being Muslim and being British, and like their French counterparts are trying to adjust to their local context.^{lxxxvi} The difference is that while Bowen looked at individual mosque-based preachers in France and the Sharī‘ah Councils in the United Kingdom, this volume has established similar arguments for the new Islamic learning centers emerging in the United Kingdom, other parts of Europe, and the United States. Further, unlike the proponents of the Sharī‘ah Councils, the scholars leading these new initiatives increasingly respect the secular state and argue that Muslims are required by Islamic law to respect the laws of the land in which they live.

While working toward a similar end, namely that of helping Western Muslims to live by Islamic norms and yet be productive members of their societies, each of the three approaches outlined above offers a distinct methodology in order to reach that end. The chapters in this volume thus help to answer the question: what are the profiles and histories of these institutions and those of the scholars who have initiated them? What tools of methodological reasoning are they using to adapt Islamic legal and moral dictates with realities faced by young Muslims in the West? Which Islamic scholars or texts do they draw upon to justify their proposed methodology of reform? How do these scholars compare with the ‘*ulamā*’ in orthodox centers of Islamic authority? What does their call for ‘indigenization of Islam in the West’ mean in practice? Will it make the integration of Muslims in the West easier?

Relating Islamic *fiqh*: core conceptual and methodological tools

A review of the writings, lectures, and speeches of the scholars whose work is profiled in this volume reveals that they are not producing a dense corps of Islamic legal treatises elaborating on complex aspects of Islamic *fiqh*. Instead, they seem to be particularly adept at selectively drawing on key concepts from Islamic legal, moral, and philosophical tradition and applying it to contemporary issues in a way that defends their particular line of reasoning on a given

subject. The neo-traditionalists in addition prefer to direct their students to works of earlier scholars, university-based academics, or prominent jurists or scholars in the Muslim-majority countries so that those interested in the deeper textual debates can obtain the relevant information. The neo-conservatives do less of such cross-referencing to the work of other scholars, but they also justify adapting specific Islamic legal principles by drawing on selected concepts from Islamic scholarly tradition. Only in the case of neo-legalists can we trace a conscious effort to develop a new methodology of Islamic legal derivation for contemporary times; initially referred to as *tawhīdīc* epistemology, the resulting scholarship eventually became subsumed under the broader banner of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*.

Thus, each of the three categories of institutions covered in this volume have slightly distinct positions on how best to relate Islamic legal and moral dictates to one's immediate realities; but all three are combining their specialist knowledge of Islamic sciences with the knowledge of Western scholarly tradition and the tacit knowledge derived from being educated, middle-class, Western Muslims.

Fiqh al-wāqi', fiqh al-aqallīyāt, maqāṣid al-sharī'ah

As in the case of the institutions profiled in Volume 1, even among the new Islamic scholarly platforms emerging in the West, *fiqh al-wāqi'* (*fiqh of reality*) is proving to be the most popular concept, along with *fiqh al-aqallīyāt* and *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, to justify adapting Islamic legal debates to modern realities. All three concepts help to emphasize that modernity has brought about significant changes, compared with the contexts in which traditional laws were originally derived, and that we need to understand the spirit of the law so that the letter of the law can be better applied to these changing circumstances. The neo-traditionalists in particular refer to this body of *fiqh* scholarship to defend their reasoning. However, they do not themselves engage in deeper conceptual debates on defining *fiqh al-wāqi'*, *fiqh al-aqallīyāt*, or *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*; instead, they often reference the writings of traditionally trained scholars in Muslim-majority countries who are writing detailed commentaries on these concepts and methods; for example, Humza Yusuf frequently refers to the work of Bin Bayyah (see Volume 1, Chapter 3). These scholars instead channel their own efforts towards the application of these rulings to every-day questions.

Humza Yusuf for instance presents a defence of Muslims' need to respect the laws of a secular state by drawing on the work of a Malaysian scholar Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, who

draws a distinction between ‘secularization’ and the ‘secular’ state; secularization, he argues, tries to overthrow all that is religious, although it is possible for a secular state to uphold religion. Drawing on this discussion, Humza Yusuf argues that an Islamic state is “neither wholly theocratic nor wholly secular,” and that a Muslim state calling itself secular does not necessarily have to work against religion.^{lxxvii} Secular politics is therefore not necessarily problematic from a Muslim perspective, as it does not necessarily have to deny religious values and virtues in politics and human affairs. Instead, he argues that a secular states can operate well without a religious grounding, even in a way that is Islamic. Developing such a line of reasoning enables Humza Yusuf to contend that secular states such as Finland and Sweden have such a high degree of social justice that Muslims can consider these states exemplary, comparable to the rule of the legendary Saladin. He argues that good governance does not rely on religion, but on a government’s commitment to basic morality, common decency and social justice. In terms of his method of reasoning, he thus draws on the writings of respected Islamic legal scholars to establish the essence of a given Islamic moral and legal principle; but he then devotes much greater attention to its application to concrete examples.

Similarly, Tim Winter consistently tries to show the relevance of an Islamic legal dictate by relating it to recent research and thinking in Western academia. Winter's essay entitled “Boys will be Boys” presents a good example of his method of reasoning. Winter argues that many debates about gender among Muslim intellectuals are limited to the classical issues of *fiqh*. While he does not deny the great importance of understanding the *fiqhi* debates on these issues, he argues that this approach has been too apologetic. What he wishes to do is "construct a language of gender which offers not a defence or mitigation of current Muslim attitudes and establishments, but a credible strategy for resolving dilemmas which the Western thinkers and commentators around us are now meticulously examining."^{lxxviii} In the essay, Winter tries to move past a dichotomy where Muslims are trying to defend their positions on gender difference to a Western audience, and instead enters into a dialogue with the new gender paradigm being debated in Western academic circles. This is precisely why Winter begins his article with a consideration of Germaine Greer's *The Whole Woman* as her work personifies the "ways in which the social and also scientific context of Western gender discourse has shifted over this period."^{lxxix}

Islamization of knowledge, tawhīdic epistemology, maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah

The neo-legalistic scholars, as noted in the previous section, have made comparatively more conscious efforts to develop new methodological tools to relate the essence of Islamic *fiqh* to modern realities. The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) set out to reformulate modern sciences on Islamic basis—to give them a “*tawhīdic*” orientation. The belief that modern sciences as currently constituted are not compatible with an Islamic way of thinking, and we need to develop scholarship and research that would adapt Western academic disciplines to Islam was central driving force behind the work of its scholars. The alternative in view of its leadership was continuity of a hopelessly divided Muslim mind-set. The development of an entirely new way of thinking, a full *tawhīdic* episteme, became IIIT’s main goal whereby the advances and contributions of modern sciences had to be understood, mastered, and then adapted to fit into an Islamic framework. However, when - despite concentrated efforts - the Islamization of knowledge project could not deliver any tangible results, IIIT chose to narrow its focus to the development of *maqāṣid al-sharī’ah* and *fiqh al-aqallīyāt* (minority *fiqh*)^{lxxx}—the two approaches which by the late 1990s were gaining traction across different groups.

The neo-legalists (IIIT’s leadership and Tariq Ramadan included), unlike the neo-traditionalists, do not agree that the methodologies developed by the four Sunni *madhhabs* are adequate to reconcile the current gap between Islamic tradition and modern sciences or the present-day realities. Tariq Ramadan maintains that the Islamic legal tradition’s current predicament stems from its inability to adapt sufficiently or satisfactorily to the seismic transformations associated with modernity. In his view, the traditionalists’ adherence to their *madhhab* precludes the sufficient use of reason; rather, their continued reliance on legal norms laid out in medieval texts prevents efforts to amend those norms to fit contemporary circumstances. He instead argues for *Salafi Reformism*, which he maintains can combine both reason and loyalty to Islamic *fiqh*: “the Text still remains the source, but reason, applied according to the rules of deduction and inference (*qawaid al-istinbat*), enjoys significant latitude for interpretation and elaboration through the exercise of *ijtihad*.”^{lxxxii}

IIIT has in particular invested heavily in supporting research and publications on *maqāṣid al-sharī’ah* and how it should be applied. Jasser Auda, previously a researcher associated with IIIT London and now a scholar with the Qatar Foundation, has made major contributions in this field. Unlike many scholars, who view the *maqāṣid* as a broad moral framework, Auda relates them to very technical aspects of legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). He advocates applying the

maqāṣid theory as a way of dealing with conflicting scriptural evidence in legal reasoning. Instead of weighing varying pieces of evidence according to different textual, hermeneutical or derivative criteria, as is the case in classical *fiqh*, Auda argues for viewing the evidence through the lens of the different types of *maqāṣid*. Such an approach, he contends, is more comprehensive, allowing for a wider range of scriptural evidence to be incorporated into legal reasoning.^{lxxxii}

While IIIT's efforts remain focused on publishing research in these areas, Tariq Ramadan is trying to develop a modern Islamic legal and ethical framework through the work on-going at the Centre for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE). By bringing together specialists in *fiqh* with specialists in the modern sciences, he is trying to develop an Islamic ethical and legal framework that is more responsive to contemporary realities and advances in other sciences. As we will see in Chapter 4, encouraging the '*ulamā*' and the scholars in modern sciences to develop a common vocabulary is not without its challenge; however, the neo-legalists are committed to finding some answers.

Reasonable citizen, reasonable pluralism (ikhtilāf), and responsible citizen

Finally, a review of the writings being produced by the neo-conservatives reveals that these scholars in fact rely heavily on *ad hoc* use of concepts from traditional Islamic legal scholarship to justify their positions. While the neo-traditionalists normally refer to a particular body of Islamic scholarship, or the work of a scholar from the classical period, to justify their position, the neo-conservatives instead often pick only on a specific concept, instead of a particular genre of scholarship, from Islamic legal tradition, to help them to justify their position. This can be expected of Yasir Qadhi, who, given his Salafi orientation, feels less bound by traditional *fiqh* scholarship, prioritising direct engagement with Qur'an and *ḥadīth* instead. Interestingly, however, the two Deobandi platforms discussed in this volume, though committed to *taqlīd* of Deobandi scholarly tradition, also defend their positions by selective use of Islamic concepts, instead of quoting specialist writings of earlier Deobandi scholars.

Arguing that Muslims today are facing problems that have no solutions in the classical texts, Yasir Qadhi argues that we need a type of scholarship that is in tune with the lived experience of the people. Otherwise, he believes, people will simply ignore the *fatwās* of the scholars and live life as they see fit. The way he proposes to do this is by talking about Islamic moral and legal guidelines in a language that his university-educated Western Muslim

followers can relate to. This is illustrated by the way he relates to the concept of ‘reasonable citizen’ in Western theory with a defence of respect for secular law. Relating the concept of ‘reasonable citizen’ to the Islamic moral framework, Qadhi argues that citizens are considered reasonable when they view one another as being free and equal, and when they believe in the criterion of reciprocity. The criterion of reciprocity requires that citizens offer one another fair terms of co-operation, and they agree to act on those terms even if it comes at a cost in a particular situation given that other citizens also act on those terms.^{lxxxiii} Reasonable citizens, therefore, understand that each individual has his or her own comprehensive doctrine of beliefs, and they do not believe that it is legitimate to impose one’s comprehensive beliefs on others. Developing this line of reasoning, he concludes that for Muslims living in the West it should not be difficult to ignore apostasy and homosexuality. He also defends the criterion of reciprocity by arguing that Muslims should be willing to support rights for other minority groups because those rights can be used in favour of Muslims as well, even if that particular right comes at a cost to Islamic values.

Like Yasir Qadhi, Ad Duha from Ebrahim College in London profiled in Chapter 6 argues that reasonable pluralism is the best protection for Western Muslims who aspire to live by their beliefs. As Razavian elaborates in Chapter 6, the term ‘reasonable pluralism’ was popularized by the political philosopher John Rawls. Ad Duha echoes similar views by invoking the Islamic concept of *ikhtilāf* (disagreement). The issue of *ikhtilāf* has a long history within Islamic thought, and Ad Duha’s usage of the term brings this history to the fore. Through the use of the concept of *ikhtilāf*, Ad Duha is able to make an argument for reasonable pluralism without necessarily having to detail its philosophical premises. Similar to Rawls’ argument, the concept of *ikhtilāf* assumes that reasonable people will develop differing opinions about issues of religious law. This issue of *ikhtilāf* is significant for Ad Duha in his discussion on voting, which tends to spark tense debates within Muslim communities in the UK. By arguing that voting is an issue of *ikhtilāf*, whereby some scholars say that it is permissible and others say that it is not, Ad Duha concludes that there is no single ruling for all people. Therefore it is not permissible to judge others on the basis of criteria which one has accepted oneself but which others have not accepted. Ad Duha extends this concept of reasonable pluralism to defend the obligation to respect the rights of non-Muslims too: although one might disagree with their religious viewpoints, it is not moral to coerce them to adhere to Islamic beliefs or actions.

In a similar kind of way, Hafiz Amin, the head of Darul Qasim also profiled in Chapter 6, puts forward the concept of ‘responsible citizen’ which is very close to Qadhi’s use of ‘reasonable citizen’. In a public statement intended to offer Muslims a general guideline on how to deal with cases of sexual harassment, the institutional leadership argues that all Muslims have a general duty to command good and forbid evil (*al-‘amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar*). It then quotes the *hadīth* in which the Prophet says: “Each one of you are shepherds and each one of you is responsible for your (own) flock.” The statement links this notion of forbidding evil to the notion of citizenship arguing that Muslims are required to be responsible citizens. The way one becomes a responsible citizen is through enacting the principle of forbidding evil. Thus, if one witnesses an evil act, one should try to stop that act by one’s own hand, or by speech, or by condemning the said act in one’s heart. But, it also made very clear that, while in a Muslim-majority country it is the duty of the state to enact Islamic law and administer punishment, and it is the combination of forbidding evil and the administration of justice through the state that “absolves the whole Muslim community from its moral and legal obligation in such matters,” the use of physical means to stop the evil act “is limited to what is allowed by the law of the land.” If the state does not allow it, it is not permissible. Although this statement is focused on only one particular incident, it highlights how Darul Qasim views the relationship between Muslims and the law of non-Muslim-majority countries: Muslims should try to stop sinful actions but they should not do anything that would be against the law; nor should they hinder the process of justice.

Thus, we see that in the West the scholars gaining attention are not necessarily engaging in deep debates on *fiqh* (although they have to be able to show enough familiarity with relevant concepts); instead their appeal rests in their ability to relate those Islamic concepts to Western philosophical and legal traditions. Since the university-educated Muslims who constitute their primary audience are more literate in the Western philosophical and intellectual tradition, efforts at popularising specific Islamic legal concepts yield better results when linked to modern concepts. Thus, the debate on *ikhtilāf* might not trigger the curiosity of a young Western-educated Muslims in its own right, but when explicitly linked to the notion of tolerance and responsible citizenship in Western legal or moral theory, it becomes both intellectually interesting and easily relatable. It is the ability of these scholars to relate Islamic moral and legal ethics to modern everyday realities and modes of thinking in a language that is familiar to the young educated Muslims in the West that explains their real appeal.

A few sociological observations

While the chapters in this volume are primarily devoted to mapping the thoughts, ideas, and reasoning of the scholars who are gaining popularity in the West especially among the younger generation of Muslims, this section briefly identifies some important sociological factors, which can help us better appreciate the basis of their appeal. These observations are based on my own fieldwork with many of these institutions whereby I have carried out interviews with these scholars as well as their followers and have also participated in many of their teaching activities. Here I outline some of the important factors that we need to study and investigate further if we are to fully understand the impact these new scholarly platforms are to have on shaping the future face of Islam and on the authority of traditional Islamic scholarly platforms profiled in Volume 1.

Building Bridges

An important aspect of these initiatives is that while advocating distinct methodological approaches they are much more open to mutual consultation and dialogue than is the norm today among the Islamic learning platforms in Muslim-majority countries. Scholars from these platforms routinely converge on similar platforms, such as the annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which attracts up to 5,000 participants each year.^{lxxxiv} Humza Yusuf, Zaid Shakir, and Tariq Ramadan^{lxxxv} are normally among the most prominent speakers at the ISNA convention and are invited to speak at all the major plenary sessions. Their appearance on these shared platforms is partly a result of the centrality of some of these non-mosque and non-*madrasah* platforms in the West to the establishment of Islamic authority.^{lxxxvi}

However, these institutions also make one-on-one contacts. Zaid Shakir from Zaytuna College was, for example, invited to speak at Ebrahim College in London in early 2016,^{lxxxvii} although the two institutions are associated with two very different traditions. At the same time, these institutions and scholars are closely connected to the traditional centers of learning in the Muslim-majority countries. In fact, until these institutions themselves start to produce solid cadres of well-trained Islamic scholars, they will remain reliant on sending their own students to traditional centers of learning in Muslim-majority countries to gain command of the Arabic

language and the most important foundational texts. The importance of these institutions rests in cultivating an interest among the young, educated, and socially progressive Muslims to engage with Islam in a way which allows for reasoned debate and is responsive to the realities of their life; their ability to ground the students in deeper Islamic texts will evolve only gradually.

Bringing parents in and developing global following

The second important feature of the attempts by these scholars to indigenize Islam in the West is their insistence that Islamic ethic is in fact consistent with the true European and American tradition; this in particular is the case with the neo-traditionalists. Western societies are seen to have deviated from their true values, and Islam is argued to have the ability to enrich these societies. More recently, however, many of these scholars have begun to suggest that the Islamic discourse evolving in the West is equally relevant to the Muslim-majority countries: due to globalization, they argue, educated and socially progressive youth across the world share similar sensibilities. This new-found confidence is the result of the growing numbers of followers that they attract in these countries. Tariq Ramadan, Humza Yusuf, Tim Winter: all three have expressed similar thoughts.^{lxxxviii} The evidence of their growing influence is also visible in the increasingly mixed age profile of their followers. They are now attracting not just second- and third-generation Muslims, but increasingly also their parents. Interviews that I have conducted across the generational divide show that most followers from the older generation became involved in these platforms through their children.

The importance of Muslims in the United States

The cross-institutional analysis also shows that within the West the United States is proving to be the most fertile ground for the emergence of some of the most promising Islamic education platforms. While four out of the six institutions profiled in this volume are based in the United States, it is more important to note that the United States has in addition many more institutions that could fit within these three categories. For example, Nouman Ali Khan's *Bayyinah* is another important example of the neo-conservative category, and *Ta'leef Collective* is an influential example from the ranks of neo-traditionalists.^{lxxxix} This vibrant Islamic scholarly milieu in the United States has much to do with the economic affluence of American Muslims.

The evidence for this is the high fees charged by some of these platforms and retreats led by neo-traditionalist scholars, which are attended not just by members of the affluent Muslim diaspora in the West but increasingly also by affluent Muslims from all across the Muslim world (Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.). The United States also is home to a much larger number of white converts involved in educational endeavors than is the case in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe.^{xc}

What is most important about these white converts is that they have made it ‘cool’ to be Muslim.^{xcⁱ} Profiles like those of Humza Yusuf and Tim Winter are making it acceptable in the eyes of young Muslims to become an Islamic scholar. They promote a strong sense of a counter-cultural way of life which is different from the norm but is not violently opposed to Western values; rather it engages deeply with the Western philosophical tradition and shows that Islam can enrich it by bringing in the metaphysical elements. This is encouraging some young boys and girls from progressive Muslim families to consider becoming *imāms*, as is evident in the profiles of the students of Zaytuna.^{xcⁱⁱ} In the Muslim world, it is still not possible to appear ‘cool’ while becoming an *imām*: the incentives in fact are reversed, as elite status in most Muslim post-colonial societies continues to be linked to being Western.^{xcⁱⁱⁱ} For young educated Muslims in the West, on the other hand, this new face of Islam in fact is more hip because most recognize that trying to be Western is often counter-productive, as one can never be “exactly like them.”^{xc^{iv}} Their ability to bring these Muslims from elite families to study of Islam is what makes their future potential even more promising.

Where to for Muslim-majority countries?

As these new institutions evolve, the institutions in the Muslim world will face growing challenges to their authority; for the immediate future they will, however, continue to attract the most ambitious graduates of the new centers in the West who want to pursue specialist study of Islamic texts. But, even after these new institutions have developed more rigorous Islamic Studies and Arabic-language programs of their own, certain features of the Muslim-majority countries will continue to give the institutions based therein an advantage. First, their students are more able to devote their energies to full-time Islamic education than those in the West; memorization does play an important role in Islamic scholarly tradition, and larger

family sizes in the Muslim-majority countries make it easier for some families to dedicate a child to the *hifz* (*Qur'ānic* memorization) process and pursuit of higher Islamic Studies.^{xcv}

Second, living in a Muslim-majority country can arguably help to sustain faith, as the reminders of Islam in everyday life are more frequent and immediate. As one of my Syrian Canadian respondents who I had met in Istanbul had noted: "In the United States one has to search for a mosque; here in my immediate neighborhood there are five mosques. I am spoilt for choice. This ease of access to the mosques or general embedding in the broader Islamic culture does help sustain the faith, as you need to make less effort to incorporate religious practice in everyday life." But the signs are that ultimately these advantages enjoyed by the Muslim-majority countries will fade away if the religious discourse emerging from the Islamic institutions that they nurture does not appeal to the mind and spirit of the modern-educated, socially progressive Muslims.

Islamic authority and responsiveness to reality

The fact that new Islamic scholarly platforms have emerged among Muslims in the diaspora is consistent with the central contention of these two volumes, which is that religious authority has to be able to demonstrate an ability to be reasonable and responsive to the demands of the changing times, while respecting the core of the tradition. These new platforms are thus a classic example of internal reform, which, as discussed by Francis Robinson and Qasim Zaman in great detail, has been an essential feature of the Islamic scholarly tradition.^{xcvi} Responding to the realities of the young Muslims in the West, these institutions are drawing on the space available within the traditional Islamic *fiqh* to argue in favor of a secular constitution and to advise their Muslim followers to respect the constitution of the land in which they live. The reasoning presented by the scholars cited in this volume provides strong evidence to critique those readings of Islamic authority that argue that it is not creativity but mere "mimicking of the past"^{xcvii} that is essential to understanding the workings of Islamic authority.

Instead, this volume shows that the institutions that are gaining a stronghold among the educated and socially progressive Muslims in the West, as well as in Muslim-majority countries, are those that are adept at respecting the core of the tradition while knowing what aspects of the tradition can be constantly debated to ensure that the tradition on the whole stays

responsive to contemporary realities. Thus, while the core of the *'aqīdah* (creed) and *ibādāt* (ritual practices) stays untouched, Islamic *fiqh* affecting everyday socio-economic and political issues is left open to reasoned debate within the parameters set by Islamic scholarly tradition. This scope for flexibility and creativity within the Islamic tradition has been central to its successful embedding over the centuries across different cultures; acknowledging this dynamic aspect of Islamic scholarly tradition should by no means be interpreted as “deception”.^{xcviii}

Yet, as we will see in this volume, the creative energy and reasoning within the Islamic scholarly platforms profiled in this volume is by no means leading to a complete replication of Western modernity and a consequent erosion of Islamic civilizational identity. Rather, what we are seeing is a growing tendency among young educated Muslims to reflect on the achievements but also the limitations of Western modernity, and its component parts. This is allowing young Muslims to pick and choose and create alternative visions of modernity, rather than simply accepting Western modernity and the related changes in the socio-economic order as an inevitable reality for all societies and communities. This is particularly so because most young Muslims in the West are growing up in families where religion is still a powerful force; the contrasts that they see between their home environment and the secular order outside it facilitates comparisons of all kinds. While the liberty and freedom of the secular tradition appeals to most, the excessive individualism and lack of spirituality create an appreciation for the tradition among the same. The result is thus a heightened desire to find a balance between individual freedom and respect for tradition—a struggle which is equally alive in the scholarship of many Western philosophers writing on the subject of modernity.^{xcix}

While Western media coverage understandably remains focused on the violent attacks being perpetrated in the name of Islam, the reality is that Western societies are also in fact nurturing platforms for the emergence of the most promising Islamic scholarly movements. In some way, both the scholarly and the militant Islamic movements present a critique of Western modernity, but while the former is confident of Islam’s ability to draw the best from Western modernity and in fact be in a position to contribute to it, the latter lacks that confidence and resorts to violence as the only expression of critique available to it. That the West is today the ground for the emergence of the most violent (namely ISIS) and at the same time the most promising trends (profiled in this volume) in the future of Islamic thought and practice is thus a fascinating puzzle, the answer to which must be explored by undertaking a detailed study of the socio-economic background of the young Muslims gravitating towards these two opposing

trends. For now, this volume aims to give the reader a taste of the rich milieu of Islamic scholarly debates evolving in the West, and to show how they are indicative of young Muslims' desires to integrate more effectively in the West and be productive members of their societies, while respecting the core of their faith.

ⁱ Sophie Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain: An Introduction* (Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi, eds., *Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe* (London–New York: Routledge, 2013); Akbar Ahmed, *Journey into America: The Challenge of Islam* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

ⁱⁱ MCB, *British Muslims in Numbers: A Demographic, Socio-economic and Health Profile of Muslims in Britain drawing on the 2011 Census* (London: The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015).

ⁱⁱⁱ MCB, *ibid.*

^{iv} Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (Chicago, Ill.; London: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

^v For fascinating insights into the changed socio-economic profile of the Islamic scholarly classes after the colonial encounter in two different contexts, see Thomas Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Francis Robinson, *The Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia* (London: C Hurst & Co, 2001).

^{vi} Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia* (Oxford–New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

^{vii} Studies from different Muslim societies show the low socio-economic profile of the *madrasah* students and teachers and the mosque *īmāms*; see Masooda Bano, *The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

^{viii} Most Muslim countries today follow modern constitutions inherited from their former colonial rulers, rather than following Islamic *sharī'ah* law. Case studies illustrating the limited application of *sharī'ah* in most Muslim countries can be found in Robert W. Hefner, ed., *Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011).

^{ix} Most post-colonial Muslim elites inherited such a world view; examples include Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and General Ayub Khan in Pakistan. This mind-set still persists, as is evident in General Musharraf's attempt to create *Enlightened Islam* as President of

Pakistan (1999–2008), and General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s pledge to bring about a religious revolution in Egypt.

^x Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, *Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

^{xi} Masooda Bano, *The Rational Believer*; in particular, see Chapter 8.

^{xii} For a review of the debate between Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy (two leading French academics and specialists on Islam) on why French Muslims join groups such as ISIS, and why this debate is becoming increasingly acrimonious, see Adam Nossiter, “‘That Ignoramus’: 2 French Scholars of Radical Islam Turn Bitter Rivals,” *The New York Times*, July 12, 2016, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/europe/france-radical-islam.html>. Kepel places more blame on context and ideological indoctrination; Roy, on the other hand, increasingly argues for recognizing individual propensities in those who are radicalized.

^{xiii} James Bell et al., “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society,” *The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Report* (Washington, DC, 2013), available online, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/>.

^{xiv} Bell et al., “World’s Muslims.”

^{xv} Tahir Abbas, ed., *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure* (London–New York: Zed Books, 2005).

^{xvi} Robert S. Leiken, *Europe’s Angry Muslims* (Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); John R. Bowen, *Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

^{xvii} Leiken, *Europe’s Angry Muslims*; Christina Capatides, “Molenbeek and Schaerbeek: A Tale of Two Tragedies,” *CBS News*, April 11, 2016, accessed June 23, 2016, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/molenbeek-and-schaerbeek-brussels-belgium-a-tale-of-two-terror-tragedies/>.

^{xviii} Abbas, *Muslim Britain*.

^{xix} Tahir Abbas, “British South Asian Muslims: State and Multicultural Society,” in Abbas, *Muslim Britain*, 3–17.

^{xx} International Monetary Fund, “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?” *IMF Issues Brief* 2000 (corrected 2002), accessed August 15, 2016, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm>.

^{xxi} Ahmed, *Journey into America*; Zareena Grewal, *Islam is a Foreign Country: American Muslims and the Global Crisis of Authority* (New York: NYU Press, 2013).

^{xxii} Pew Research Center, “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” Pew Research Center Report 2007, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.pewresearch.org/2007/05/22/muslim-americans-middle-class-and-mostly-mainstream/>.

^{xxiii} Grewal, *Islam is a Foreign Country*

^{xxiv} “Muslim-American Demographics Reveal A Diverse Group That Rejects Categorization,” *The Huffington Post*, March 26, 2014, accessed August 15, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/26/muslim-american-demographics_n_5027866.html.

^{xxv} Carol Brown, “Prisons Are Breeding Grounds for Jihadists,” *American Thinker*, December 5, 2014, accessed August 13, 2016,

http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2014/12/prisons_are_breeding_grounds_for_jihadists.html; “Black Muslims, the NOI and American Prisons...,” *Prison Culture*, July 16, 2012, accessed August 13, 2016, <http://www.usprisonculture.com/blog/2012/07/16/black-muslims-and-american-prisons/>.

^{xxvi} van Bruinessen and Allievi, *Producing Islamic Knowledge*; Jonathan Laurence, *The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

^{xxvii} van Bruinessen and Allievi, *Producing Islamic Knowledge*.

^{xxviii} Ahmed, *Journey into America*; Zareena Grewal, *Islam is a Foreign Country*.

^{xxix} van Bruinessen and Allievi, *Producing Islamic Knowledge*; Ahmed, *Journey into America*.

^{xxx} Thijl Sunier, Nico Landman, et al., “Diyamet: The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a Changing Environment,” *VU University Amsterdam and Utrecht University Research Report* (2011), accessed August 18, 2016, http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Diyamet_report_2011_tcm250-421402.pdf

^{xxxi} Bowen, *Can Islam be French?*

^{xxxii} Brigitte Maréchal, “Mosques, Organisations, and Leadership,” in *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society*, ed. Brigitte Marechal et al. (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2003), 79–150; Brigitte Maréchal, “Modalities of Islamic Instruction,” in *ibid.*, 19–77. These and other chapters in this volume present a highly useful account of the organization of Islamic education in different countries of Europe and how reliance on imams invited from overseas to staff mosques in Europe remains a serious concern for the four western European states (France, Germany, Netherlands, and UK) that have sizeable Muslim populations.

^{xxxiii} M. Amer Morgahi, “An Emerging European Islam: The Case of Minhajul Qur’an in the Netherlands,” in *Producing Islamic Knowledge*, ed. van Bruinessen and Allievi, 47–64.

^{xxxiv} Pew Research Center, “Muslim Americans.”

^{xxxv} Abbas, ed., *Muslim Britain*.

^{xxxvi} Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat, eds, *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North* (Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)

^{xxxvii} Umm Raiyaan, “Why Are New Muslims Leaving Islam?,” *Islam21c*, August 7, 2012, accessed August 17, 2016, <http://www.islam21c.com/islamic-thought/5823-why-are-new-muslims-leaving-islam/>; Ahmed Eid, “UnMosqued: Why Are Young Muslims Leaving American Mosques?,” *The Huffington Post*, December 17, 2013, accessed August 17, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ahmed-eid/young-american-muslims_b_4109256.html; Andrew Anthony, “Losing Their Religion: The Hidden Crisis of Faith Among Britain’s Young Muslims,” *The Guardian*, May 17, 2015, accessed August 17, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/17/losing-their-religion-british-ex-muslims-non-believers-hidden-crisis-faith>.

^{xxxviii} These issues came up repeatedly in the interviews that I have conducted with young Muslims in the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

^{xxxix} Leon Moosavi, “Are Converts More Likely to be Extremists than Other Muslims?,” *The Guardian*, May 24, 2013, accessed August 17, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2013/may/24/islam-converts-woolwich-attackers-extremists>; Beenish Ahmed, “Why Converts to Islam are so Susceptible to Becoming Terrorists,” *ThinkProgress*, February 3, 2016, accessed August 17, 2016, <https://thinkprogress.org/why-converts-to-islam-are-so-susceptible-to-becoming-terrorists-118582cfa179>.

^{xl} The Zaytuna tuition fee for the academic year 2016–2017 is US\$19,000, plus US\$10,000 is required to cover housing costs: Zaytuna College, “Admissions,” accessed August 15, 2016, <https://www.zaytuna.edu/admissions/>; participation in the three-week Rihla retreat costs over US\$3,000 per person: Deen Intensive Foundation, “The Rihla Program,” accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.deenintensive.com/the-rihla-program/>; joining the ten day ‘umrah program with Sacred Caravan similarly costs close to \$4,000 per person: Sacred Caravan, “The 2016 Sacred Caravan Umrah Program,” accessed August 15, 2016, <http://sacredcaravan.wufoo.com/forms/z1aornk918rw72v/>.

^{xli} All these institutions also run active fundraising campaigns using all media to advertise. During Ramadan, these efforts intensify: routine e-mail messages are circulated on their mailing lists, asking people to donate generously and reminding them of the importance and benefits of giving *zakāt*, *sadaqah* and *khayrat*.

^{xlii} Laurence, *The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims*, 133.

^{xliii} *Ibid.*

^{xliv} *Ibid.*

^{xlv} *Ibid.*

^{xlvi} van Bruinessen and Allievi, *Producing Islamic Knowledge*.

^{xlvii} MCB was founded in 1997; details of its activities can be found at its official website, *The Muslim Council of Britain*, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/>.

^{xlviii} Laurence, *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims*, 244.

^{xlix} Gilles Kepel quoted in Laurence, *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims*, 11.

¹ Brigitte Maréchal, "Modalities of Islamic Instruction," in *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe*.

^{li} Matthew Bowlby and Benjamin van Impelen, "The Imam Training Debate: The Future of Religion for Dutch Muslims," *Humanity in Action*, accessed August 13, 2016, <http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/190-the-imam-training-debate-the-future-of-religion-for-dutch-muslims>.

^{lii} Isabelle de Pommereau, "German Universities Move to Train Next Generation of Imams," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 19, 2012, accessed August 13, 2016, <http://islam.ru/en/content/story/german-universities-move-train-next-generation-imams>.

^{liii} van Bruinessen and Allievi, *Producing Islamic Knowledge*.

^{liv} *Ibid.*

^{lv} For a review of such assertions and their critique, see, Yahya Michot, *The Father of Islamic Radicalism? Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule* (Oxford: Interface Publications, 2006).

^{lvi} An increasing number of al-Ghazali's works are now available in English. There is also increase in scholarly books, seminars, and study workshops focused on study of al-Ghazali's thought. His image is also often invoked in popular media to highlight the more philosophical and mystical dimensions of Islam: *Al-Ghazali The Alchemist of Happiness*, directed by Ovidio Salazar [DVD] (Matmedia Productions, 2004), a film on al-Ghazali, is one example.

^{lvii} For example, Humza Yusuf's lecture entitled "This is the Muhammad You Call a Terrorist" shows 55,844 hits (*YouTube*, February 23, 2009, accessed August 17, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ySCNYLL4NWQ>).

^{lviii} For information about Alqueria de Rosales's activities, see its official website, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://alqueriaderosales.org/>.

^{lix} Bowen, *Can Islam be French?*; Esra Özyürek, *Being German, Becoming Muslim: Race, Religion, and Conversion in the New Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

^{lx} *Ibid.*

^{lxi} Charles Taylor.

^{lxii} Zaytuna College, "About, Our Mission," accessed 13 August 2016, https://www.zaytuna.edu/about/our_mission/.

^{lxiii} *Ibid.*

^{lxiv} *Ibid.*

^{lxv} *Deen Intensive Foundation*, accessed August 17, 2016, <http://www.deenintensive.com/>; *Sacred Caravan*, accessed August 17, 2016, <http://www.sacredcaravan.com/>; *Sandala*, accessed August 17, 2016, <https://sandala.org/>.

^{lxvi} Cambridge Muslim College, “Four-Year Programme,” Cambridge Muslim College, accessed 15 August 2016, <http://www.cambridgemuslimcollege.org/programmes/four-yp/>.

^{lxvii} *Ibid.*

^{lxviii} See the *International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)* website, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.iiit.org/>.

^{lxix} *Ibid.*

^{lxx} See the *CILE—Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics* website, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.cilecenter.org/>.

^{lxxi} *Ibid.*

^{lxxii} Interview with Shaykh Mohammed Amin Kholwadia, Chicago, August 2014.

^{lxxiii} “Our Seminars,” *AlMaghrib Institute*, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://almaghrib.org/seminars>.

^{lxxiv} *Ibid.*

^{lxxv} “No Doubt (God, Religion and Politics in the Modern World) [Seminar Profile],” *AlMaghrib Institute*, accessed May 21, 2016, <http://almaghrib.org/seminars/islamic-theology/no-doubt#info>.

^{lxxvi} Bowen, *Can Islam Be French?*; Bowen, *On British Islam*.

^{lxxvii} Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas, *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), 29.

^{lxxviii} Timothy Winter, “Boys Will Be Boys,” masud.co.uk, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/boys.htm>.

^{lxxix} *Ibid.*

^{lxxx} International Institute of Islamic Thought, “Research Grants.”

^{lxxxi} *Ibid.*, 28–29, also 22.

^{lxxxii} Jasser Auda, “A *Maqāṣidī* Approach to Contemporary Application of the *Sharī‘ah*,” *Intellectual Discourse* 19 (2011), 193–217.

^{lxxxiii} *Ibid.*, 446.

^{lxxxiv} See the website of the *Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)*, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.isna.net/>.

^{lxxxv} At the 2012 ISNA convention held in Washington DC in August, which I attended, Tariq Ramadan presented his *CILE* project to a packed hall and highlighted how the methodological tools his team is trying to develop will make Islam answer real life concerns faced by young Muslims who want to be part of the West while staying true to their Islamic faith.

^{lxxxvi} See *Reviving the Islamic Spirit in Canada*, accessed August 17, 2016, <http://risconvention.com/>.

^{lxxxvii} “Visiting Scholar–Imam Zaid Shakir (Zaytuna College USA),” *Ebrahim College*, August 26, 2014, accessed August 17, 2016, <https://ebrahimcollege.org.uk/visiting-scholar-imam-zaid-shakir-zaytuna-college-usa/>.

^{lxxxviii} Reference needed.

^{lxxxix} See their respective websites at: *Bayyinah*, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://bayyinah.com/>; *Ta’leef Collective*, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://taleefcollective.org>.

^{xc} An observation based on my own fieldwork.

^{xci} This reference was made by Dr Umar Faruq Abd-ullah in a seminar he gave in Medina, when leading the 2016 Sacred Caravan ‘umrah trip in place of Humza Yusuf, April 2016.

^{xcii} Jack Jenkins, “What It’s Like to Attend America’s First Accredited Muslim College,” *ThinkProgress*, April 18, 2016, accessed August 17, 2016, <https://thinkprogress.org/what-its-like-to-attend-america-s-first-accredited-muslim-college-e129701dbed6#.5wkg0xlnn>.

^{xciii} Ammara Maqsood, “‘Buying Modern’: Muslim Subjectivity, the West and Patterns of Islamic Consumption in Lahore, Pakistan,” *Cultural Studies* 28 (2014), 184–107.

^{xciv} A common response during my interviews.

^{xcv} Masooda Bano, *The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), Chapter 4.

^{xcvi} Francis Robinson, “Islamic Reform and Modernities in South Asia,” *Modern Asian Studies* 42 (2008), 259–281; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

^{xcvii} Hussein Ali Agrama, *Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and The Rule Of Law in Modern Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); see discussion in the Introduction to Volume 1.

^{xcviii} Ibid.

^{xcix} Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*; for a review of others Western thinkers sharing similar critiques of Western modernity, see Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

