Mixing Tradition and Politics: the Da'wa Salafiyya's Support of the Military in Post-Morsi Egypt

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This paper analyzes the history and evolution of the Da'wa Salafiyya (the Salafi Call), currently Egypt's most influential Salafi organization and founding body of the Al Nour Party. It looks at how the sheikhs of the Da'wa Salafiyya have made claims to legitimacy and tried to assert their authority, especially since the 2011 Revolution. More specifically, it aims to depict the textual identity of the movement by looking in detail at some of the most significant fatwas its sheikhs have published, in particular the recent fatwas in support of Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. I argue that the organization has altered its interpretation of its main religious corpus to justify siding with the military since the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. In its fatwas, the Da'wa Salafiyya selects specific symbols and events in Islamic history, engages with them in an unsystematic manner and does not always include Qu'ranic or hadith references. The case of the Da'wa Salafiyya's rise as the main voice of Salafism in Egypt shows that 'Salafi' as a categorical label must be redefined to accurately represent this revivalist movement's approach to Islamic sources. This research is primarily based on extensive fieldwork in Egypt between 2012 and 2014.

The Navigation In and Around Salafism: A Case Study of Yasir Qadhi

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The Salafi call in the west is renowed for its zealous preservation of orthodoxy – something which creates the foundations of authority and ultimately serves as a source of appeal to young Muslims disillusioned by their sense of identity. Recently, there is an observable trend of western-born and raised callers to Islam who have gained massed popularity through social media. Yasir Qadhi is one of these influential public figures. His involvement with the Maghrib Institute has over the years seen a gradual shift from his previous 'Salafist' stance to a more inclusive 'pluralistic' one. He has subsequently come under criticism from those ascribing to the Salafi methodology. This paper presents a case study of Qadhi's shifting position and how and on what grounds he has negotiated his current stance. The aim is to see how Qadhi has transferred elements of 'Salafism' to his current position in order to keep that element of authority and appeal whilst blending it with other elements. I do a CDA of his criticisms of the 'Salafi Movement' along with its scholars as well as the refutations of the 'Salafis' against him seeing how he has responded to them.

Official and folk Islam in Changing Context: Muslim Women, and Islamic Authority Figures of Tashkent

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This paper will investigate religious practices in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and the transformation of these practices between 1924 and today. The focus of this paper is the relationship between the Muslim women and the state and religious institutions which affect them. Indeed, traditionally the state and religious institutions have controlled and constructed the religious spaces and practices of its women citizens. My paper show that religious practices that affect women have, in fact, changed and adapted to different historical periods, political systems, and social change and transformation.

Between 1924 and today, we have observed two contrasting lives of women in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Firstly, during the Soviet period the state organised an anti-Islamic campaign declaring religion the 'opium of the masses', destroying 'traditional' knowledge, banning everyday religious practices and creating new 'progressive' Soviet public holidays. The Soviet-Islamic authority called SADUM served the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The Soviet state pushed Islam underground, undermined its intellectual elites and subordinated its 'folk' ritualistic character.

Official and folk Islam in Changing Context: Muslim Women, and Islamic Authority Figures of Tashkent (cont.)

Secondly, after 1991 the search for a new national identity involved the national revisiting religious consciousness, for example, changing the names of the streets, public discussion about pre-Soviet national heroes, giving new value to local traditions, and celebrating *Navruz* (pre-Islamic) and *Eid* (Islamic). Islam has moved from the private to the pubic sphere. The state has opened the educational department under the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan, Tashkent Islamic Institute (*Oliy Ma'had*) and ten other Islamic educational Institutions. However, radical groups and parties have emerged after 1991, which some fear might cause social unrest. In response the Uzbek government has toughened its policy on Islam. The state has begun to promote local, 'peaceful', 'traditional' Islam, and condemn 'radicalism' and 'foreign' strands of Islamism.

The paper will discuss about transformation of the life cycle rituals of Uzbek women, during and after the Soviet period. In this context Uzbek life cycle rituals changed according to the policy of the government and the religious and political developments in the country. A study of women's ritual life can be deeply relevant for understanding women's religiosity and the process of change and transformation. Lastly, I will look at the role of religious authority figures (*otins, imams*, and other religious clergy) and official religious institutions. Keeping in mind that these religious bodies existed in the historical collective and folk memory of the population for some time regardless of state ideology, I will discuss their relevance in the lives of Muslims today.

Instrumentalisation of Islamic Piety in the Indonesian Presidential Election of 9th July 2014

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The dynamics of Muslim community in Indonesia are interesting to explore, especially after the country emerged from the authoritarian rule of the former president General Soeharto. After being repressed during the period of authoriarianism , various Islamic organisations and political parties began to thrive and played an important part during the *Reformasi* period. Examples of the prominent success of the Islamic elements was the election of both Abdurrahman Wahid as the President of Indonesia and Amien Rais as the Head of MPR, Indonesia's upper house of Parliament, during the period of 1999-2004. Both Wahid and Rais were the leaders of Indonesia's two biggest Muslim organisations: Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

Earlier this year, Indonesia held a celebrated political event: its third democratical Presidential election on 9th July 2014. It is interesting to note that while the two presidential candidates did not have an Islamic background, they and their supporters used Islamic symbolism and rituals extensively to win the support of Indonesian Muslims. This paper seeks to explore how the appearance of Islamic piety was used during the Presidential election campaign and how this instrumentalisation of Islamic piety translated into political authority after the election.

Citizenship Politics, Moderation and Muslim Minority Politics in India

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The presentation will focus on the transformation of Muslim minority politics in India over the last 20 years. I will argue that a fundamental shift has occurred from an identity dominated, inward-looking and obedient approach to minority politics such as security concerns and protecting the Muslim Personal Law towards an inclusive debate centered on socio-economic marginalisation, and minority upliftment . At the core of discussion will be the recent scholarly work on the *moderation process* of Islamist organisations and movements and the notion of Muslim *citizenship politics*, which highlights the novel engagement of Islamist parties and Muslim minority groups in India's multi-party politics and diverse civil society landscape. Therefore, I question the persistence of Islamism assumption and challenge widely held views in the Indian and global context that Islam and Muslim politics are incompatible with a democratic framework and the modern nation state. I will underpin this argument with empirical evidence from my fieldwork in India, researching the *Popular Front of India*, a Muslim minority social movement from South India with its political wing the *Social Democratic Party of India*. This Muslim minority movement constitutes a compelling case study representing a newly emerged class of community leaders, who are symbolically breaking away from traditional vote bank politics of established parties and the religious leadership. Drawing on insights from social movement and collective action theories and on literature about Islamism and secularism, I will argue that India's secular democracy compared to most other undemocratic regimes in the Middle East provides us with a fresh framework to understand this moderation phenomenon within Islamist movements.

Contesting Islamic Reformisms and Authoritative Interpretations of Being a 'True Muslim': Everyday Life Experiences and Religious Practices of Birmingham Muslims

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The paper attempts to explore contestations and multiple interpretations of being a 'good and successful person' among Muslims in Birmingham, UK. While majority of Muslims in Birmingham came as economic migrants few decades before, the city has a significant Muslim community with strong beliefs in various interpretations of Islam and belongingness with various sects with its wider implication on everyday social life of community. The paper explains how various Muslim groups experience multiple streams of Islamic reformisms while making their everyday life practices relevant with modern world and in accordance with Islamic principles. The paper also investigates the role history and everyday life struggle for recognition of their presence by various Muslim individuals, groups and sects in order to establish their 'spiritual and moral authority' over Muslim community in Birmingham, in general.   The present research is a part of PhD dissertation and data is collected through ethnographic fieldwork done in Birmingham over the period of one year. The paper narrates that the struggle to establish 'spiritual authority' by offering a particular stream of Islamic reformism by Muslim individuals and groups to wider Muslim community is not an isolated 'religious phenomenon': rather in their everyday socio-economic practices, various Muslim groups compete with each other for worldly success by making alliances of religious, economic and political in nature. Muslim groups use their beliefs in a particular stream of Islamic reformism as best possible 'ideological' option to live a successful and moral life in otherwise 'culturally sinful and economically competitive' Britain.

Approaching Religious Difference Differently in Pakistan – Al-Mawrid and Coke Studio

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Pakistani society, with its multiple Muslim denominations and orientations and small non-Muslim communities, is seeing high levels of aggression towards religious and sectarian targets. In a context where multiple discourses about what it means to be a 'true' Muslim, jostle for ascendency, and the dominant impulse tends towards denouncing all 'others' as abhorrent, this paper analyses the response of contemporary Muslim agents that advocate more accommodating conceptualisations of difference in a heterogeneous societal reality. I trace, and contrast two public actors in Pakistan: the 'moderate' Sunni scholar, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and his Al-Mawrid school, and the successful Sufi music initiative, Coke Studio Pakistan. I examine their claims (or non-claims) of authority to speak for "Islam" and the ways in which they select and interpret Islamic 'texts'. A different epistemological approach to religious understanding emphasises reasoning with the 'other'. And a Sufi inspired poetic narrative depicts the complex motivations of its producers.

Embracing the Qur'an, Contesting Reform: the Limits to Women's Islamic Authority in Senegal

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Amidst the global increase of Muslim women's authority within Islamic schools, this paper considers how the first female teacher in a village in northern Senegal has been received, where women's formal religious education was previously unheard of. It illuminates the dynamic whereby the teacher's authority to teach girls basic Islamic practice and Qur'anic memorisation has been accepted by local Sufi clerics, who are increasingly advocating for women's formal Islamic education to counteract Western culture, but her other ideologies which threaten clerics' legitimacy are silenced. Indeed, the women's school is popular among parents wanting their daughters to learn the Qur'an. However, they also contest the teacher's ideologies through socialisation, when she demands greater veiling, encourages women to lead prayer, and criticises Sufism. These points of tension reflect the teacher's interpretation of Islam based on Salafi-inspired, anti-Sufi reformist ideology rooted in Shafi law, which stands in opposition to customary Senegalese Islam linked to Maliki jurisprudence which the Sufi ulama upholds. Thus, although the teacher has contributed to expanding women's legitimacy to teach the Qur'an, her wider authority to define local orthopraxy is narrowly curtailed through inhabitants' counteractive socialisation practices and clerics' labelling of her as '*ibado*' or extremist.

Islamic Society, Secularity and the State: a Study in Moral Reorientation

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The fragmentation of Islamic authority represents one of the major shifts associated with modern Muslim societies, and it is linked with a number of important changes in contemporary Islamic religiosity. It is my hypothesis that the fragmentation of authority is in fact a sign of a more fundamental change within Muslim society. As Wael Hallaq and Hussein Ali Agrama have argued, the modern state--be it Western or Islamic--undermines the religious basis of a society by exercising its power in ways that serve its own ends. As a result, the state necessarily infringes upon the pre-existing societal framework of the sharia, around which Islamic society had previously been oriented. This represents a form of secularization, wherein religious authority--and religiously based authority--are subordinated to the state and/or relegated to their own, often marginal, sphere of society.

Islamic Society, Secularity and the State: a Study in Moral Reorientation (cont.)

I argue that the result of this is a moral reorientation of Islamic society. Even if pre-modern Muslim governments could be considered secular, their power was derived from the moral-legal framework of the sharia, upheld and maintained by religious authorities. The modern state, however, exercises exclusive control over the legal framework of society, separating it from morality, which becomes a more widely contested space. While religion remains operative within this space, adherence to any moral framework becomes an individualized concern, lacking an institutionally supported, societal basis. Thus, though Muslims continue to adhere to the moral norms of the sharia, precisely what those norms are, how they are understood and how they should be carried out are matters of significant, unceasing debate, as is the more fundamental question of who can speak on these issues. This is the setting for the fragmentation of Islamic authority, in which new types of actors and differing conceptions of Islamic, as well as other moralities compete for Muslims' attention and acceptance.

Tradition and Authority: a Pragmatist Critique of Shabestari's Hermeneutics

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Mohammad Mujtahid Shabestari, a reformist Iranian intellectual, has put forward a new understanding of tradition based upon his own version of hermeneutics with the intended goal of establishing Human Rights within Shi'i Islam. His understanding of hermeneutics states that one must correct one's prejudices and assumptions based upon the social sciences before interpreting the traditional literature. I will argue that, instead, one begins with the tradition at hand and argues for different viewpoints in a piecemeal fashion, but that it can culminate into a paradigm shift. I will also argue this understanding of critique within tradition explains the sequential thought process that Shabestari himself went through.

Tawhīd as Public Interest in Khomeni's Discourse

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One of the most central elements of Khomeini's political thought is his conception of *maslahat* (public interest). Khomeni's approach to public interest departs from his understanding of *irfan* (Islamic gnosis) and *shari'a* (Islamic law) as methodologies for the construction of knowledge and the establishment of an Islamic political order.

Khomeini promoted the practice of *tawhīd*, or the asseveration of the oneness God, in the promotion of a new Islamic way of life in Iran and beyond. His discourse demonstrated that the protection of the practice of *tawhīd* was an important element of Khomeini's definition of "public good" or "general interest." He portrayed *tawhīd* as being in the interest of Muslims and advanced the idea of the Islamic government as the only political structure that would prioritize the Muslims' interest in freely exercising *tawhīd*. According to Khomeini, only an Islamic government could take into consideration the needs and rights of Muslims to practice their faith and worship God. This paper will show how Khomeini portrayed *tawhīd* as public interest in order to draw support for the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran, and justify and advance the revolutionary Islamic political identity across the Muslim community.